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AUTONOMY REGIMES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
YoRow DINSTEIN*
I.
1. What is an autonomy regime? Linguistically, the term is derived from
Greek: auto means self and nomos is law. Autonomy, in the legal-political
vocabulary, denotes self-rule or self-government. Obviously, this is a broad
concept, which is applicable in manifold unrelated contexts. It is there-
fore necessary to clarify that in the present paper an autonomy regime will
denote a system of self-government-within the borders of a sovereign
country-set up in a specified region (or several regions). In other words:
Autonomous areas are regions of a State, usually possessing some
ethnic or cultural distinctiveness, which have been granted sepa-
rate powers of internal administration, to whatever degree, with-
out being detached from the State of which they are part.'
2. An autonomy regime is not to be confused with a federal system of
government.2 Like federalism, an autonomy regime is predicated on the
principle of integration of separate entities within the single political
fabric of a State. However, federalism conveys a general decentralization
of powers within a State, dividing the entire-or almost the entire-coun-
try into cantons (whatever semantic designation is used to call the cantons:
provinces, territories, or even "states"), all of which enjoy a prescribed
measure of self-government. Equality (or at least parallelism) in the de-
gree of self-government, with which all the cantons are vested, is the hall-
mark of a federal State. In an autonomy regime, an extraordinary
measure of self-government is conferred on a chosen region (or regions),
while similar powers are not enjoyed by other parts of the country. An
autonomy regime is thus an exception to the rule: it is based on a prefer-
ential, non-homogenous treatment of a selected area (or areas).
3. The texture of autonomy varies from one regime to another, there
being no hard and fast rules defining the dimensions of self-government
to be exercised. Differently put, there is no "minimum level of indepen-
dence" required for the status of autonomy to exist.3 All that can be said is
that an autonomy regime has an intermediate status between "a non-self-
* Professor Emeritus of International Law, Tel Aviv University (Israel);
Member, Institut de Droit International.
1. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 323 (Ox-
ford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2006).
2. See Rudolf Bernhardt, Federalism and Autonomy, in MODELS OF AUTONOMY 23,
23 (Yoram Dinstein ed., 1981).
3. Hurst Hannum & Richard B. Lillich, The Concept ofAutonomy in International
Law, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 858, 885 (1980).
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governing territory and an independent State."4 Absent a universal
formula of autonomy, it is necessary to scrutinize-in each instance-not
only the latitude given a regional authority in running local affairs, but
also the quantum of influence that the autonomous region wields on the
three branches (executive, judicial, and legislative) of the central govern-
ment of the State as a whole.
II.
4. General international law does not impose an obligation on any State
to create an autonomy regime anywhere within its territory. The establish-
ment of an autonomy regime-like that of federalism-is derived from
the internal constitution or legislation of the State concerned. If the pro-
visions of the constitution/legislation with respect to autonomy are
breached, remedies must consequently be sought through domestic
channels.
5. Nevertheless, in certain cases, an autonomy regime is spawned either
by a treaty (whether multilateral or bilateral) or by a recommendation of
an organ of an international organization (notably, the United Nations
General Assembly or Security Council). The existence of a binding treaty
alters the legal landscape, inasmuch as disputes relating to its application
or interpretation may trigger international adjudication (thus, a singularly
important judicial decision was rendered by the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice in the case of the Memel autonomy, addressed infra 32).5
Clearly, a breach of any treaty gives rise to State responsibility on the inter-
national plane.
6. A multilateral treaty laying the foundations of an autonomy regime
will usually follow a major war, when borders are redrawn and sovereignty
over a certain region is allocated to a State (frequently, a new State) sub-
ject to certain conditions. Of course, for the autonomy to be binding, the
treaty must be in force. Thus, "a scheme of local autonomy" for Kurdistan
(with undefined borders) was envisaged by the Principal Allied Powers in
Article 62 of the 1920 Sivres Treaty of Peace with Turkey.6 In the event,
this instrument never came into force and plans for Kurdish autonomy in
Turkey were shelved, although " [t]he Kurds have never accepted their fate
quietly."7 By contrast, the autonomy regime in the Memel Territory was
4. Thilo Marauhn, Financing Autonomy Through Financial Autonomy? Fiscal and
Monetary Aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian Agreements from a Public International Law Per-
spective, in NEW POLITICAL ENTITIES IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw:
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE PALESTINIAN ENTrrY 291, 296 (Amos Shapira &
Mala Tabory eds., 1999).
5. See Interpretation of Statute of Memel Territory (U.K. v. Lith.), 1932
P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 49, at 294 (Aug. 11).
6. Svres Treaty of Peace with Turkey, Aug. 20, 1920, reprinted in 3 MAJOR
PEACE TREATIES OF MODERN HISTORY 1648-1967, at 2055, 2077 (Fred L. Israel ed.,
1967).
7. See MARGARET MACMILLAN, PARIs 1919: Six MONTHS THAT CHANGED THE
WORLD 454 (2002).
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successfully shaped by the same Principal Allied Powers in another multi-
lateral treaty (see infra 32).
7. The treaty on which an autonomy regime is based may also be bilat-
eral, for instance an agreement concluded between Finland and Sweden
regarding an autonomy regime in the Aaland Islands (see infra 33). There
is also the possibility of a combination of a bilateral and a multilateral
treaty (see the example of South Tyrol infra 34). The difference naturally
is that in a bilateral treaty only one country (the other contracting party)
may take action if the implementation of the autonomy regime engenders
disputes, whereas in a multilateral treaty the circle of the States directly
involved is wider.
8. The question whether a State introducing an autonomy regime acts
exclusively on its own initiative or pursuant to binding treaty obligations is
of cardinal import from the viewpoint of international law. This is preemi-
nently true should the central government desire to amend the autonomy
regime or revoke it altogether, contrary to the wishes of those benefiting
from the arrangement. As will be seen (infra 27), an attempt to abolish
unilaterally an autonomy regime (notwithstanding protests emanating
from its beneficiaries) is bound to have grave political reverberations (per-
haps kindling a fire that will grow into a conflagration). But, legally speak-
ing, if the foundation of the autonomy regime is solely domestic, the State
is only required to observe the strictures of its own legal system as regards
constitutional or legislative amendments (it being understood that a con-
stitutional amendment is more complex than the revision of ordinary leg-
islation). Conversely, if an autonomy regime is grounded-in whole or in
part-in a binding treaty, the State cannot do as it pleases: it must act in
compliance with its international undertakings.
9. An autonomy regime is linked to international law whether or not it is
introduced pursuant to a binding treaty (or recommendation by an organ
of an international organization). Even when autonomy is put in place by
free will of the local State (there being no external legal constraints in
play), the regime is ordinarily hammered out for the benefit of a minority
the rights of which are protected by international law (see infra 11).
10. Once an autonomy regime springs to life-and, again, whether or
not this is done as a result of a treaty obligation-the autonomous region
may be allowed to conduct some direct international contacts with foreign
countries. It may also be authorized to make decisions which have consid-
erable repercussions in the international arena, e.g., in terms of member-
ship in international organizations (see the illustration of Greenland
withdrawing from the European Union, infra 30).
III.
11. The raison d'etre of an autonomy regime is usually a response to the
needs of a minority living within the boundaries of a State. Although-as
indicated (supra 4)-there is no obligation under general international
439
3
Dinstein: Autonomy Regimes and International Law
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2011
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEw
law to create an autonomy regime, international law does bestow protec-
tion on certain minorities. The gist of this protection is expressed in Arti-
cle 27 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CP
Covenant):
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied
the right, in community with the other members of their group,
to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own relig-
ion, or to use their own language.8
The language of Article 27 of the CP Covenant is repeated verbatim (with
an addition) in Article 30 of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the
Child.9 In the opinion of the present writer, the essence of Article 27 of
the CP Covenant is declaratory of contemporary customary international
law.
12. As aptly summarized by Rfidiger Wolfrum, "Article 27 has to be un-
derstood as providing a minimum of protection against enforced integra-
tion or assimilation."' 0 That is to say, what contemporary international
law rejects is the construct of an enforced national melting pot, which
would deny protected minorities the right to be different from the major-
ity of the population of the State in which they live. However, the practical
dimensions of this right to be different are often intensely debated (e.g.,
as regards the right of Moslem women to cover their faces in public in
Western countries).
13. In 1992, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a (non-bind-
ing) Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Eth-
nic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (Declaration)." The Declaration
states that it is "[i]nspired" by Article 27 of the CP Covenant.1 2 Yet, the
text introduces the new phrase of "national minorities." No explanation is
offered for the addition, although the use of the conjunction "or" suggests
that it is limited to "ethnic, religious and linguistic" minorities.13 The ex-
pression "national minorities" has caught on, as is evident from a (bind-
ing) 1995 European Framework Convention for the Protection of
8. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, 1966 U.S.T. 521, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
9. Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989,
1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 54.
10. Rfidiger Wolfrum, The Emergence of "New Minorities" as a Result of Migration,
in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 153, 164 (Catherine Br6lmann
et al. eds., 1993).
11. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 47th
Sess. Supp. No. 49 (Vol. I), U.N. Doc. A/47/49 (Vol. 1), at 210 (Dec. 18, 1992).
12. See id.
13. See Natan Lerner, Group Rights and Discrimination in International Law, 15
INT'L STUD. Hum. RTs. 16 (1991).
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National Minorities (the European Convention) . The European Con-
vention does not define the term "national minorities." Although the ex-
pression has several possible meanings in the abstract,15 it has to be
interpreted-like all other treaty phrases-in its proper context. The Pre-
amble of the European Convention refers to the "ethnic, cultural, linguis-
tic and religious identity" of persons belonging to a national minority.' 6
These are the same categories of minorities benefiting from international
legal protection pursuant to Article 27 of the CP Covenant. The adjectives
"ethnic, religious and linguistic" are mentioned up front in the text of
Article 27, and the right "to enjoy their own culture" is specifically men-
tioned later on. Patently, minorities that do not have an ethnic, cultural,
linguistic, and religious identity are excluded from the range of interna-
tional legal protection (although such minorities may benefit from protec-
tion under domestic law).
14. The lack of definition goes beyond the term "national minority."
There is no consensus as to the circumstances in which a particular group
qualifies as a religious minority (the issue of "sects" is particularly riven
with tensions), a linguistic minority (are local dialects to be considered
languages for this purpose?), or, above all, an ethnic or cultural minority.
In 2004, the European Court declined to intervene in a Polish decision
not to recognize the existence of a "Silesian" national minority.' 7
15. The rights spelt out in the European Convention are guaranteed to
"persons belonging to national minorities."' 8 Article 27 of the CP Cove-
nant also affords its protection to "persons belonging to ... minorities." It
is therefore frequently argued that the rights predicated on international
law are confined to individuals (persons) and do not appertain to any mi-
nority group as such.' 9 But, in the opinion of the present writer, the cor-
rect approach is that Article 27 of the CP Covenant (if not the European
Convention) confers collective human rights on minorities as groups and
not merely on the individuals belonging to such minorities.20
16. A corollary of the absence of a general international legal obligation
for States to set up autonomy regimes is that national minorities do not
14. Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, openedfor signature Feb. 1, 1995, 2151 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter European Framework
Convention].
15. See Geoff Gilbert, Minority Rights Under the Council of Europe, in MINORITY
RIGHTS IN THE 'NEW' EUROPE 53, 55-56 (Peter Cumper & Steven Wheatley eds.,
1999).
16. European Framework Convention, supra note 14, at 246.
17. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, COMMENTARY 300-
03 (Olivier de Schutter ed., 2010) (discussing Gorzelik v. Poland, 2004-I Eur. Ct.
H.R. 107).
18. See European Framework Convention, supra note 14, at 247-50.
19. See, e.g., A.H. ROBERTSON & J.G. MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
151-54 (4th ed. 1996).
20. See Yoram Dinstein, Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities, 25
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 102, 118 (1976).
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have a right to gain autonomy under general international law. 2 1 Still,
there is no doubt that one effective way of ensuring the protection of eth-
nic, religious, linguistic, and cultural minorities is to grant them self-gov-
ernment in regions where they are concentrated demographically and
where they constitute a majority of the (local) population. Autonomy en-
hances the opportunities for a national minority to secure the develop-
ment of its own separate culture, religion, or language in its place of
habitation.
17. It is well worth quoting the 1990 Copenhagen Document on the
Human Dimensions of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in
Europe (CSCE):
The participating States note the efforts undertaken to protect
and create conditions for the promotion of the ethnic, cultural,
linguistic and religious identity of certain national minorities by
establishing, as one of the possible means to achieve these aims,
appropriate local or autonomous administrations corresponding
to the specific historical and territorial circumstances of such mi-
norities and in accordance with the policies of the State
concerned. 22
It follows from this passage that obtaining autonomy by any national mi-
nority within a particular region (i) depends on the policies of the State
concerned; (ii) is linked to "historical and territorial circumstances"; and,
above all, (iii) is only one of several options to ensure the protection of
minorities. It is striking that the text does not even include a "clear recom-
mendation to establish autonomy."2 3
18. The common rationale of setting up an autonomy regime within a
particular region is that a national minority living there will become a re-
gional majority. However, an autonomy regime is not attuned to the
needs of every national minority group. If the minority is dispersed all
over the territory of a State-in such a manner that it does not form a
demographic majority in any geographic portion of the country-the
grant of autonomy to any particular region would still leave the national
minority in the position of a minority even regionally.
IV.
19. It must be appreciated that, insofar as purely religious and linguistic
minorities are concerned, the establishment of an autonomy regime in
their favour is the optimal solution: such minorities cannot possibly ask for
21. See Patrick Thornberry, The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-Determination
with Some Remarks on Federalism, in 16 DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw: MOD-
ERN LAw OF SELF-DETERMINATION 101, 134 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993).
22. Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human
Dimensions of the CSCE, June 29, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1306, 1319, 1 35.
23. See Ruth Lapidoth, Autonomy: Potential and Limitations, 1 INT'LJ. ON MINOR-
rrv & GRP. RTs. 269, 272-73 (1994).
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more. But that is not necessarily the case with a national minority based
on ethnic and cultural kinship (which may evidently encompass religious
and linguistic elements). Such a minority may be considered to be a peo-
ple or a part of a people. When a people constitutes a majority in a de-
fined region of a State, it is entitled to self-determination. As proclaimed
by common Article 1(1) of both the CP Covenant and the twin Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development.24
20. The International Court of Justice pronounced, in the East Timor
case of 1995, that the assertion that the right of peoples to self-determina-
tion has an erga omnes character "is irreproachable."2 5 This was confirmed
in the 2004 Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of
a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.26 In the exceptional circum-
stances of erga omnes obligations (a phrase first employed by the Court in
the 1970 Barcelona Traction case 2 7 ), each and every State in the world is
vested with rights corresponding to these obligations, thus obtaining a jus
standi in the matter.28
21. The right of self-determination is guaranteed to all peoples wherever
they are, and it is not confined (as is sometimes contended) to colonial
territories.29 Moreover, the exercise of the right of self-determination is
not contingent on the group suffering from oppression. Even if a people
enjoys the full spectrum of protection as an ethnic minority pursuant to
Article 27 of the CP Covenant-and notwithstanding the fact that it may
already benefit from an autonomy regime-it is entitled to freely deter-
mine its political future. That means that a people concentrated in a spe-
cific geographic region (where it forms a majority) has a choice. On the
one hand, it may accept an offer of internal self-determination within the
borders of a "multinational" State through an autonomy regime. On the
other hand, it can invoke the right of external self-determination: namely,
insist on secession and the formation of a new sovereign State.3 0 The
24. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 8, at 179;
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signa-
ture Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
25. East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 102 Uune 30).
26. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Pales-
tinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 172 (July 9).
27. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32
(Feb. 5).
28. See Yoram Dinstein, The Erga Omnes Applicability of Human Rights, 30
ARCHIV DES VOLKERRECHTS 16, 18-19 (1992).
29. See PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORI-
TIES 214-15 (1991).
30. On the right to secession, see Yoram Dinstein, Self-Determination Revisited,
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question whether the right of self-determination embraces the right to se-
cession was raised-but not dealt with-by the International Court ofJus-
tice in its Advisory Opinion of 2010 on Accordance with International Law of
the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo.3' The Supreme
Court of Canada, in reference to Quebec, held in 1998 that international
law does not grant a right of unilateral secession to component parts of
sovereign States (subject to exceptional circumstances that are inapplica-
ble to Quebec).32 All the same, the empirical evidence-epitomized by
the break-up of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia-does
not bolster this decision.
V.
22. When a people aspires to attain full-fledged statehood (external self-
determination)-but is realistically barred from attaining that objective-
it may conclude that the alternative of an autonomy regime within the
boundaries of a multinational State (internal self-determination) is the
only workable political compromise. In such a scenario, autonomy may be
reluctantly offered and resentfully received.3 3 The trouble is that, in time,
built-in tensions are liable to flare up in violence. Autonomy may then
become a mere stepping stone to independence.
23. Furthermore, the establishment of an autonomy regime in salutary
circumstances-in which it is generously offered and gratefully accepted
by a beneficiary national minority-does not mean that the historical
clock necessarily stops ticking. Experience shows that autonomous territo-
ries "seem to be constantly striving to extend their particular form of local
government." 34 Notwithstanding the fact that the prospect of indepen-
dence may not loom on the horizon when an autonomy regime is set up,
the very exercise of self-government may build up a momentum that may
eventually raise the banner of moving from autonomy (i.e., limited self-
government) to full-fledged sovereignty. Greenland is the clearest illustra-
tion (see infra 30).
24. An autonomy regime may also be perceived from the word "go" as a
stop-gap measure-a temporary stage-prior to transition to full-fledged
statehood. The prime example today is that of the Palestinian autonomy
(see infra 36). Everybody knows that a sovereign State of Palestine will
emerge sooner or later, however long and arduous the road to statehood
31. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Inde-
pendence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, 1 82-83 (July
22).
32. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, COMMENTARY,
supra note 17, at 688, 689-92 (discussing Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998]
2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.)).
33. See Robert A. Friedlander, Autonomy and the Thirteen Colonies: Was the Ameri-
can Revolution Really Necessary?, in MODELS OF AUTONOMY, supra note 2, at 135, 136.
34. Bengt Broms, Autonomous Territories, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTER-
NATIONAL LAw 308, 311 (Rudolph Bernhardt ed., 1992).
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might be. The sporadic violence characterizing the region is due to the
inability to reach a negotiated settlement about specifics, not least bor-
ders. Nevertheless, the objective is not in doubt. That being said, it must
be underscored that the issue of Palestine is different from the others dis-
cussed in the present paper, inasmuch as it relates to territories under
belligerent occupation, 3 5 rather than constituting integral parts of a State.
25. Despite the abundant historical illustrations suggesting that auton-
omy regimes are ephemeral in nature, it must not be presupposed that
autonomy is inherently doomed to failure. Indeed, some autonomy re-
gimes have flourished for long durations, without necessarily leading to
profound disputes and ultimately to rupture. The best example is that of
the Aaland Islands (see supra 7 and infra 33).
26. Even when largely successful, the creation of an autonomy regime
cannot remove or resolve all problems characterizing cohabitation of ma-
jority and minority groups in a multinational country. In fact, the very
concession of self-government to a national minority (forming a regional
majority) might mean that-within that region-the national majority
(which is a regional minority) would need protection from the local (au-
tonomous) authorities. Besides, assuming that there are several minorities
in the country, the creation of regional autonomy for one of them would
not affect the status of the others (who would remain minorities both na-
tionally and regionally and whose relations with the regional authorities
may be no less-perhaps more-strained than with the central govern-
ment). Additionally, the solution of the problem of members of a na-
tional minority living in the region subject to an autonomy regime does
not address (and perhaps even complicates) the predicament of members
of the same national minority living elsewhere in the country without ac-
cess to the benefits of autonomy.
VI.
27. On the whole, it is impossible to answer the question why a certain
people is satisfied with (or at least reconciled to) the status of internal self-
determination-living in an autonomous region-whereas another de-
mands external self-determination. Sometimes this can be due to eco-
nomic, social, and political incentives offered with a view to maintaining
the territorial integrity of a multinational State. But on other occasions, a
people would rather have sovereignty even at the expense of economic
prosperity. Improved living conditions per se provide no assurance of a
stable autonomy regime. It is very difficult to explain why in the same
country-Spain-autonomy is relatively successful in Catalonia but, not-
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withstanding the grant of autonomy and economic progress, terrorism has
been rampant in the Basque region. 3 6
28. An autonomy regime may disappear as a result of tectonic changes
brought about by a major war. This is what happened to the Memel au-
tonomy (infra 32) in the wake of World War II. However, as a rule, once
an autonomy regime takes root, there is no way back. Absent tectonic
changes, the introduction of self-government is practically an irreversible
step. A unilateral abolition of an autonomous regime by the State that set
it up is bound to backfire. The two leading examples are Eritrea (see infra
35) and Kosovo (see infra 31). In both instances, an autonomy regime was
largely accepted by the ethnic minority affected until arbitrarily revoked
by the State (Ethiopia and Serbia, respectively). The abolition of the au-
tonomy regime only radicalized the situation and fuelled the fire of
secession.
VII.
29. To better understand the workings of autonomy regimes, it is pro-
posed to sketch here a brief outline of some paradigmatic instances in
different parts of the world, each marked by its own distinct characteris-
tics. As will be shown, all autonomy regimes have at least some effects that
cross international frontiers. The pivotal question, however, is whether
the autonomy regime is embedded in domestic or international law.
30. The emergence of an autonomy regime may be due exclusively to a
domestic process, there being no pressure from the outside to proceed in
that direction. Greenland is the conspicuous model. The autonomy re-
gime was created by Denmark-on its own initiative-in the Greenland
Home Rule Act of 1979 (which entered into force the same year, following
a referendum).3 7 Two important points must be stressed:
(i) As a result of another referendum, held in 1982, Greenland
withdrew in 1985 from the European Economic Community (the
present-day European Union), which Denmark had joined in
1973; Greenland was accorded "overseas countries and territo-
ries" status in the EEC.38
(ii) Thirty years after the Home Rule Act, in 2009, following
again a referendum, numerous additional powers were trans-
ferred to the local government of Greenland. Future indepen-
dence is openly bruited about as a viable option at the time of
writing.
36. See HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION:
THE AccoMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 275-79 (1990).
37. See Isi Foighel, A Framework for Local Autonomy: The Greenland Case, in MOD-
ELS OF AUTONOMY, supra note 2, at 31-52. The text of the Greenland Home Rule
Act of 1978 is reproduced in DOCUMENTS ON AUTONOMY AND MINORITY RIGHTS 212,
213-218 (Hurst Hannum ed., 1993).
38. See HANNUM, supra note 36, at 343.
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31. If Greenland illustrates a domestic autonomy regime developing
(and growing) without rancour, the diametric opposite is Kosovo. The
Constitution of the former Yugoslavia defined Kosovo as an Autonomous
Province, a constituent part of Serbia.39 However, Kosovo's autonomy was
abolished by Serbia unilaterally in March 1989, and subsequent efforts to
bring about its restoration failed.40 After violence had erupted in Kosovo,
the Security Council-in Resolution 1160 (1998), acting under Chapter
VII of the United Nations Charter-expressed support for "an enhanced
status for Kosovo which would include a substantially greater degree of
autonomy and meaningful self-administration." 4 1 In Resolution 1199
(1998), also acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council af-
firmed that the deterioration of the situation there "constitutes a threat to
peace and security in the region."4 2 When no negotiated agreement was
arrived at, NATO conducted an air campaign against Serbia in order to
compel it to accept a settlement of the issue of Kosovo. By using inter-
State force without getting a prior authorization of the Security Council
for such enforcement action, NATO acted in breach of the United Nations
Charter,4 3 but militarily it prevailed and Serbia gave ground. In the wake
of the hostilities, in June 1999, the Security Council adopted Resolution
1244 (1999), which-determining that "the situation in the region contin-
ues to constitute a threat to international peace and security" and again
acting under Chapter VII-decided "on the deployment in Kosovo, under
United Nations auspices, of international civil and security presences," one
of the main responsibilities of which would be "[p]romoting the establish-
ment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-govern-
ment in Kosovo," within Serbia.4 4 After several years of United Nations
administration, in February 2008, Kosovo declared independence: the dec-
laration was rejected by Serbia and the international community has been
divided over the issue of recognition of Kosovo's independence.4 5 In Oc-
tober 2008, upon the request of Serbia, the General Assembly asked the
International Court of Justice for an Advisory Opinion on the legality of
Kosovo's declaration of independence. In July 2010, the Court-on the
narrowest possible ground (and without addressing the issue of the right
39. Yugoslavia, in DOCUMENTS ON AUTONOMY AND MINORITY RIGHTS, supra note
37, at 761, 763.
40. See Richard Caplan, International Diplomacy and the Crisis in Kosovo, 74 INT'L
AFF. 745, 748-50 (1998).
41. S.C. Res. 1160, 1 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160, at 2 (Mar. 31, 1998).
42. S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199, at 2 (Sept. 23, 1998).
43. See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 313-15 (4th ed.
2005).
44. S.C. Res. 1244, 11 5, 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999).
45. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAw 452-53 (6th ed. 2008).
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to secession)-gave its opinion that Kosovo's declaration of independence
"did not violate general international law."4 6
32. A completely different mode of setting up an autonomy regime is in
pursuit of a treaty. The prototype is Memel. The autonomy regime
here-for the benefit of the largely German population-was based on
two interlinked multilateral treaties. First off, in Article 99 of the 1919
Peace Treaty of Versailles, Germany renounced title to Memel in favour of
the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.4" Then, in the Paris Conven-
tion Concerning the Territory of Memel, concluded in 1924 by Britain,
France, Italy, Japan, and Lithuania, the four Principal Allied Powers trans-
ferred to Lithuania title to Memel, subject to the convention's stipula-
tions. 4 8 The convention provided: "The Memel Territory shall constitute,
under the sovereignty of Lithuania, a unit enjoying legislative, judicial, ad-
ministrative, and financial autonomy within the limits prescribed by the
Statute set out in Annex I."'4 As noted (supra 27), the Memel autono-
mous regime (like the Free City of Danzig) was washed away by the politi-
cal and demographic seismic changes inflicted on that part of the world by
World War II. The German population moved westward, and Memel
(under the name of Klaipeda) is fully integrated in Lithuania.
33. The treaty leading to the creation of an autonomy regime may be
bilateral, rather than multilateral. The leading scenario is that of Fin-
land's Aaland Islands. The autonomy of the Aaland Islands was engen-
dered by a bilateral agreement between Finland and Sweden, concluded
in 192150 (not to be confused with a multilateral Convention of the same
year on the Non-Fortification and Neutralisation of the Aaland Islands).5 1
The terms of the bilateral agreement were approved by the Council of the
League of Nations in 1921, and the application of its provisions was put
under its supervision.52 Finnish domestic legislation for the implementa-
tion of the autonomy of the Aaland Islands was adopted already in 1922
and later updated.53 In the post-World War II period, the seminal Finnish
46. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Inde-
pendence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, 11 82-84 (July
22).
47. Treaty of Peace with Germany, June 28, 1919, S. Doc. No. 66-51, at 483-85
(1919), reprinted in 2 MAJOR PEACE TREATIES OF MODERN HISTORY 1648-1967, supra
note 6, at 1265, 1338.
48. Convention Concerning the Territory of Memel, May 8, 1924, 29 L.N.T.S.
85, 87-89.
49. Id. at 89.
50. See DOCUMENTS ON AUTONOMY AND MINORITY RIGHTs, supra note 37, at
142-43 (reproducing text of agreement).
51. Convention on the Non-Fortification and Neutralisation of the Aaland Is-
lands, Oct. 20, 1921, 9 L.N.T.S. 211, reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 744
(Manley 0. Hudson ed., 1931).
52. See DOCUMENTS ON AUTONOMY AND MINORIfY RICHTs, supra note 37, at 143
(reproducing text of agreement).
53. On the legislative history, see RUTH LAPIDOTH, AuTONOMY FLEXIBLE SOLU-
TIONS To ETHNIC CONFLICTS 71-77 (1996).
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domestic legislation was the Aaland Autonomy Act, enacted in 1951; it has
since been replaced by a new Autonomy Act of 1991.54 Amendment of
the Autonomy Act is possible by congruent decisions of both the Finnish
Parliament and the Aaland Legislative Assembly.5 5 It is noteworthy that,
generally speaking, current Finnish legislation confers on the Aaland Is-
lands an even greater measure of autonomy compared to the original ar-
rangement. 56 In 1994, the autonomy arrangement for the Aaland Islands
was anchored in Finland's Constitutional Acts. 5 7 Interestingly, unlike
Greenland, the Aaland Islands' Legislative Assembly opted in 1994-fol-
lowing an advisory referendum-to join the European Economic Commu-
nity (together with Finland) .58 The question whether the Aaland Islands
can-at some future time-withdraw unilaterally from the European
Union is a matter of scholarly debate.5 9
34. An autonomy arrangement may be based on both a bilateral and a
multilateral treaty. This is the case of South Tyrol. The autonomy regime
here is based on Article 116 of the Italian Constitution, promulgated in
1947 (in force since 1948), according autonomy-the forms and condi-
tions of which were to be detailed by statute-to Trentino-Alte Adige (as
well as to four other regions: Sicily, Sardinia, Friuli-Venetia Julia, and the
Valle d'Aosta) .60 The projected statute (adopted by ordinary legislation)
was originally enacted in 1948 and then replaced by a new Autonomy Stat-
ute of 1972.61 All these domestic measures came about as a result of two
tiers of treaty law: first, a bilateral treaty between Italy and Austria (the so-
called De Gasperi-Gruber agreement), concluded in Paris in 1946; and
then, the 1947 Paris Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated
Powers and Italy, which incorporates in Annex IV the text of the bilateral
agreement of 1946.62 Article 10(2) of the Peace Treaty sets forth: "The
54. Act on the Autonomy of Aland, Aug. 16, 1991, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON
AUTONOMY AND MINOITY RIGHTS, supra note 37, at 117.
55. Id. at 138.
56. See Lauri Hannikainen, The International Legal Basis of the Autonomy and
Swedish Character of the Aland Islands, in AUTONOMY AND DEMILITARISATION IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAw: THE ALAND ISLANDS IN A CHANGING EUROPE 57, 63-65 (Lauri Han-
nikainen & Frank Horn eds., 1997).
57. See Markku Suksi, On the Entrenchment of Autonomy, in AuToNoMY: APPLICA-
TIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 151, 156 (Markku Suksi ed., 1998).
58. See id. at 167-68.
59. See Niklas Fagerlund, The Special Status of the Aland Islands in the European
Union, in AUTONOMY AND DEMILITARISATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw: THE ALAND IS-
LANDS IN A CHANGING EUROPE, supra note 56, at 189, 237-38.
60. Art. 116 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.), reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WoRLD 1, 26 (Rfidiger Wolfrum et al. eds., Supp. 2006).
61. See Christopher Schreuer, Autonomy in South Tyrol, in MODELS OF AuTON-
OMY, supra note 2, at 53, 55, 65; see also Autonomy Statute for the South Tyrol 10
Novembre 1971, n.670, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON AUTONOMY AND MINORITY
RIGHTS, supra note 37, at 460, 462-95.
62. Treaty of Peace with Italy, Feb. 10, 1947, 61 Stat. 1245, 49 U.N.T.S. 3,
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Allied and Associated Powers have taken note of the provisions (the text of
which is contained in Annex IV) agreed upon by the Austrian and Italian
Governments on September 5, 1946."63 This clause appears to vest each
of the Allied and Associated Powers with a jus standi should there be a
dispute concerning the implementation of the bilateral Austrian-Italian
agreement. But it is noteworthy that the Settlements of Dispute stipula-
tion in the Peace Treaty (Article 83,64 providing for the establishment of a
Conciliation Commission) does not apply to disputes which may arise in
giving effect to Article 10 or Annex IV. Although, initially, a lot of friction
was generated by the autonomous regime in South Tyrol, eventually an
informal agreement between Austria and Italy (known as the "Package
Deal") was arrived at in 1969.65 The Package Deal seems to have resolved
all outstanding issues between the two countries. Furthermore, since both
Italy (from the beginning) and Austria (since 1995) are members of the
European Union-and since they are both signatories to the Schengen
arrangement and are members of the Euro Zone-the borders between
the two countries are open, the currency is the same, and many previous
reasons for friction have simply disappeared.
35. At times, the fundamental role of a (binding) treaty in an autonomy
regime is replaced by a (non-binding) resolution of an organ of an inter-
national organization. This is the case of Eritrea. Eritrea was an Italian
colony occupied by the British in World War 11 (1941). British administra-
tion went on after the end of the war pending negotiations as to the future
of the territory. In December 1950, the United Nations General Assembly,
in Resolution 390(V), recommended that "Eritrea shall constitute an au-
tonomous unit federated with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the Ethio-
pian Crown."66 It took a while for United Nations legal experts to work
out the necessary legal details, but in 1952 power was handed over by Brit-
ain to Ethiopia and an autonomy regime in Eritrea was established simul-
taneously.67 The autonomy regime was set out in an Ethiopian Federal
Act, adopted in 1952, incorporating a Constitution of Eritrea.6 8 The Eri-
trean autonomy was in force until 1962, when Eritrea was fully annexed by
Ethiopia in a unilateral act.6 9 An armed struggle seeking Eritrean inde-
63. Id. art. 10(2).
64. Id. art. 83.
65. See Frances Pinter, Changes in the South Tyrol Issue, 1977 Y.B. OF WORLD AFF.
64, 69-74.
66. G.A. Res. 390(V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, U.N. Doc. A/1561,
at 20 (Dec. 2, 1950), reprinted in 3 UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS, SERIES 1: RESOLU-
TIONs ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 94 (Dusan J. Djonovich ed., 1973).
67. See The Question of Eritrea, 1952 Y.B. OF THE U.N. 262, 262-66.
68. See Theodor Meron & Anna M. Pappas, The Eritrean Autonomy: A Case Study
of a Failure, in MODELS OF AUTONOMY, supra note 2, at 183, 187-88. The text of the
Constitution of Eritrea is reproduced in DOCUMENTS ON AUTONOMY AND MINORITY
RIGHTS, supra note 37, at 628, 633-61.
69. On the liquidation of the Eritrean autonomy, see Haggai Erlich, The Eri-
trean Autonomy 1952-1962: Its Failure and Its Contribution to Further Escalation, in Mon-
ELS OF AUTONOMY, supra note 2, at 171, 179-80.
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pendence was soon started against Ethiopia. By 1991, this struggle
culminated with complete success. Eritrea declared its formal indepen-
dence (following a referendum) in 1993. Independence did not necessa-
rily mark the end of the tensions with Ethiopia. A border dispute between
Eritrea and Ethiopia triggered a full-scale war in 1998-2000 and reignited
further hostilities in 2003. Since 2003, an Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Com-
mission has issued multiple dispute-settling awards; but at the time of writ-
ing it is by no means clear that the conflict is completely over.70
36. An exceptional case in many respects is that of the Palestinian auton-
omy. The autonomy regime in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was cre-
ated by a series of international agreements between Israel and the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) representing the Palestinians.
The salient features of the autonomy regime are enunciated in the 1994
Cairo Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area,7 1 superseded by
the 1995 Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.7 2 The
Interim Agreement speaks chiefly about "transfer of powers and responsi-
bilities," but also about "self-government arrangements. "7 The self-gov-
ernment is supposed to be exercised by an Executive Authority subject to
an elected Council.74 The term "autonomy" as such is not used in the
Interim Agreement, although "full autonomy to the inhabitants" of the
West Bank and Gaza was envisaged already in the 1978 Camp David
Framework for Peace in the Middle East, concluded between Israel and
Egypt.7 5 The legal status of the Interim Agreement between Israel and the
Palestinians is not entirely clear. Strictly speaking, the instrument is not a
treaty, since one of the Contracting Parties is not a State.76 Still, the In-
terim Agreement is looked upon by both parties as assimilated to an inter-
national treaty (thus, Israel has published it in its treaty series Kitvei
Amana), inasmuch as Palestine is viewed as a State in statu nascendi. The
Interim Agreement is bilateral. Yet, it was formally "witnessed" by the
United States, the Russian Federation, Egypt, Jordan, Norway, and the Eu-
ropean Union.7 7 The legal repercussions of the act of witnessing are
obscure.78
70. See generally THE 1998-2000 WAR BETWEEN ERITREA AND ETHIOPIA: AN INTER-
NATIONAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVE (Andrea De Guttry et al. eds., 2009).
71. Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, Isr.-PLO, May 4,1994,
33 I.L.M. 622.
72. Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Israel-PLO,
Sept. 28, 1995, 36 I.L.M. 551.
73. Id. at 558-59.
74. Id. at 559-60. For the roles of the Council and the Executive Authority,
see Joel Singer, The Emerging Palestinian Democracy Under the West Bank and Gaza Strip
Self-Government Arrangements, 26 IsR. Y.B. ON Hum. RTs. 313, 334-43 (1996).
75. Agreement on the Framework for Peace in the Middle East, Egypt-Isr.,
Sept. 17, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 1466, 1467.
76. See ANTHONY AusT, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTIcE 62 (2d ed. 2007).
77. See Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, supra note
72, at 568.
78. See AuST, supra note 76, at 101-02.
451
15
Dinstein: Autonomy Regimes and International Law
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2011
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEw
37. The degree of practical exercise of autonomy by the Palestinian Au-
thority has ebbed and flowed since the 1995 Interim Agreement.7 9 The
reasons are diverse:
(i) The "Second Intifada" of 2000-2004 brought about an Israeli
reoccupation of the more heavily populated areas in the West
Bank, so that autonomy-for a while-was largely suspended de
facto.
(ii) In 2005, Israel unilaterally withdrew from the Gaza Strip.
(iii) Due to Hamas's violent takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007,
the Palestinian Authority has lost its power there.
(iv) Hostilities between Israel and Hamas have flared up-in va-
rying degrees of intensity-on several occasions (especially in the
winter of 2008-2009). In fact, the Gaza Strip has been subjected
by Israel to a state of siege, which has created controversies re-
garding access of humanitarian assistance.
(v) In 2010, the Palestinian Authority is exercising growing au-
tonomy in the West Bank. But the Gaza Strip, although de facto
autonomous, is not subject to the Authority's writ.
(vi) Direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians-as
regards a permanent status agreement-have been suspended
and not yet started by the time of writing.
It is necessary to recall that, as stated (see supra 24), the Palestinian auton-
omy is different from the other regimes discussed in the present paper,
since it relates to territories under belligerent occupation.
VIII.
38. In conclusion, there is no set formula of a successful autonomy re-
gime that can be imitated or transplanted elsewhere. As pointed out, it is
impossible to answer the question why a certain minority-people is recon-
ciled to the status of internal self-determination-living in an autonomous
region-whereas another insists on external self-determination. Some-
times, this can be due to economic, social, and political incentives offered
with a view to maintaining the territorial integrity of a multinational State.
But, on other occasions, a people would rather have sovereignty even at
the expense of economic prosperity; improved living conditions per se
provide no assurance of a stable autonomy regime.
39. If the record of success of two enduring autonomous regimes-Aa-
land Islands (supra 33) and South Tyrol (supra 34)-is to serve as a model,
one may deduce that, for an autonomy regime to succeed, (i) it is advanta-
79. For the legal position in 1998, see Yoram Dinstein, The International Legal
Status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip-1998, 28 ISR. Y.B. ON Hum. RTs. 37
(1998).
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geous to set it up on an island (geographically isolated from cross-border
interference by neighboring States), or, short of that, (ii) the neighboring
State (in which the majority has the same ethnic composition as most of
the inhabitants of the autonomous region) must not adopt an irredentist
policy and should encourage the local population to reconcile itself to
internal self-determination; and (iii) it is useful for the two neighboring
countries in such a situation to belong to a regional organization like the
European Union. But Greenland (supra 30) shows that being an island is
not an ironclad guarantee of the status quo and even membership in the
European Union may not be appreciated. The moral of the story, per-
haps, is that no two cases are alike and the preservation of the status quo
can never be guaranteed.
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